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DENCE OBTAINED BY "LIE-DETECTOR."

[Wisconsin]
The defendant, on
trial for robbery, offered "lie-detector" testimony as to the truthfulness of his alibi, and as to his
innocence of the crime itself. The
trial court refused to admit the evidence, and the defendant appealed.
Held: that the evidence was inadmissible; conviction affirmed: State
v. Bohner (Wis. 1933) 246 N. W.
314.
The opinion of the court in this
case contains a quotation from defense counsel's brief to the effect
that the defendant offered to prove
"by Prof. Leonarde Keeler," of the
Northwestern University Crime Detection Laboratory, of Chicago, Illinois, by a test upon the defendant
with his instrument known as the
'lie-detector' that the defendant was
not in the city of Tomah on the
date of the robbery and was not
guilty."
This language has conveyed the impression that Mr.
Keeler actually conducted the tests
referred to, and that he participated
in the trial of the case. As a matter of fact, however, he never did
test the defendant or anyone else
suspected of this particular robbery.
The extent of his participation
consisted of correspondence with
the defense counsel, in which Mr.
Keeler consented merely to examine
the defendant and render a report
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to defendant's counsel. Moreover,
Mr. Keeler advised and requested
that no attempt be made to introduce evidence either as to his willingness to conduct the test or as to
any report he might render upon
the resulV of his examination-it
being thought advisable to await a
more favorable opportunity to seek
judicial recognition of such evidence, and at a time when more
complete data and information
could be presented for a court's consideration. Nevertheless, the present. decision represents a refusal to
admit "lie-detector" evidence in a
criminal proceeding.
Long before psychologists ever
attempted to develop a scientific
technique for detecting deception,
persons of average intelligence must
have observed the fact that conscious lying ordinarily produces certain emotional disturbances such as
blushing, squinting of eyes, squirming, peculiar monotone of the voice,
throat pulsation, cold sweat, and a
host of other manifestations. These
phenomena were not merely observed
and then set apart for psychological
theorizing. They actually played,
and still play, an important part in
practical affairs - especially so in
our judicial system. Every judge
and every jury, perhaps unknowingly, gives considerable weight to
physical reactions when an accused
or a witness is giving testimony in
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the trial of a case. And this has
received judicial sanction. A court
may even go so far as to instruct
the jury that in determining the
credibility of a defendant in a criminal case they may take into consideration his demeanor and conduct, both upon the witness stand
and during the trial. Boykin v.
People (1896) 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac.
419.
Contra: Purdy v. People
(1892) 140 Ill. 50, 29 N. E. 700.
Moreover, it is very generally held
that the conduct, demeanor, and
words of one charged with crime,
about the time of its commission or
of its discovery, or upon his arrest
for or upon his accusation of it,
are admissible as evidence against
him. McAdory v. State (1878) 62
Ala. 154, 159. See 1 Wigmore
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) § 273.
It is apparent, therefore, that the
notion of detecting deception by
utilizing certain psycho-physiological principles is not entirely new.
The most reliable "lie-detector"
perfected up to the present time is
the Keeler Polygraph: Larson "Lying and Its Detection" (1932)
xv. It consists of two units, one
recording continuously and quantitatively the blood pressure, or
rather the deviations from a known
pressure and volume flow of blood;
the other recording respiration. A
third unit is to be added shortlyone recording the psycho-galvanic
reflex, an indicator of the change
in skin resistance to an imperceptible electrical current administered
during the period of questioning,
the variation being attributable to
supposed changes in the activity of
sweat glands. While this third unit
is not new, heretofore some difficulty has been encountered in recording graphically its extremely
For detailed
sensitive reactions.
discussion of the mechanical fea-

tures of the instrument, see Keeler
"A Method for Detecting Deception" (1930) 1 Am. J. Police Sci.
38, which article is quoted at length
in Wigmore "Principles of Judicial
Proof" (2d ed. 1931) 615.
Physiological irregularities, such
as high blood pressure, etc., or emotional instability caused by worry
or psychological strain, do not interfere with the deception test, because these factors are ascertained
in the "control" part of the record.
In other words, that part of the
record made by the subject while
being asked the few customary irrelevant questions (e. g., Have you
had breakfast this morning?-requiring an answer of "yes" or "no,"
without explanatory remarks) will
indicate the physiological and psychological peculiarities of the particular individual. Significance is
attached only to the deviations from
the "norm" at the points where the
subject is being interrogated as to
his participation in the crime under
investigation.
Within the past eleven years
(the last three with the. assistance
of Charles M. Wilson), Keeler
who is now forensic psychologist at the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern University School of Law, has
conducted approximately fourteen
thousand deception tests. And in
the numerous criminal cases full
confessions have been secured in
some seventy-five per cent of those
in which the record indicated deception regarding the pertinent
questions propounded of the suspect.
Although no claim is asserted as
to the infallibility of this deception
technique, the results obtained over
a period of years have indicated a
remarkable degree of accuracy.
But is perfection a prerequisite to
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judicial recognition?
Professor
Wigmore, in his discussion of scientific evidence in general, has
stated that it is only necessary for
something of a scientific nature to
have "a reasonable measure of precision in its indications."
See 2
Wigmore "Evidence" (2d ed. 1923)
§990. The admissibility of blood
hound evidence: State v. King
(1919) 144 La. 430, 80 So. 615; 8
R. C. L. §177, of evidence of similarity of foot-marks: State v. McLeod (1930) 198 N. C. 649, and of
conduct to show insanity: 1 Wigmore, supra §228 et seq.-all "are
striking examples of the fact that
the conclusiveness in the inference
called for by the evidence is not a
requirement for admissibility." See
McCormick "Deception Tests and
the Law of Evidence" (1927) 15
Cal. L. Rev. 484, 500.
The instant case is the second in
which an appellate court passed
upon the admissibility of "lie-detector" evidence. The first was
Frye v. United States (D. C. 1923)
293 Fed. 1013, 34 A. L. R. 145, in
which a federal court rejected the
testimony of W. ,M. Marston, one
of the early experimenters with
"lie-detectors."
Under the present procedure of
conducting "lie - detector" tests,
members of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory staff always
obtain the consent of a suspected individual. No one is ever compelled
to subject himself to an examination. All are apprised of the nature
and significance of the tests. Therefore, under the rule admitting evidence voluntarily given by the accused, there is no doubt as to the
propriety, as far as its constitutionality is concerned, of admitting the
polygraph record thus obtained or
expert opinion testimony concerning
its interpretation.
This would

clearly constitute a waiver, and
such evidence might be used against
an accused for the purpose of proving that he lied in answering certain questions pertaining to his participation in a given crime.
Where the suspected individual
refuses to submit to the test, his
constitutional guaranty against selfincrimination may seem to afford
him protection against a compulsory
examination. And yet, upon the
analogy of several other types of
cases there should be no valid objection on this ground. For instance, an accused person may be
compelled to stand up in court for
the purpose of identification: People v. Gardner (1894) 144 N. Y.
119, 38 N. E. 1003, 28 L. R. A. 699;
to place his feet in a suitable position for view by the jury: State v.
Prudhomme (1873) 25 La. Ann.
522; to make foot-marks for comparison with those found at the
scene of the crime: Biggs v. State
(1929) 201 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 129,
64 A. L. R. 1085; to make fingerprints for the same purpose: People
v. Sallow (1917) 100 Misc. 447, 165
N. Y. Supp. 915; to submit to a
physical examination for scars or
wounds: O'Brien v. State (1890)
125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R.
A. 323; to exhibit certain tatoo
marks to the jury: State v. Ah
Chuey (1879) 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am.
Rep. 530.
"Lie-detector" evidence is of a
nature similar to that used in the
foregoing cases. The instrument
merely records the reactions in a
subject's blood pressure and respiration when asked questions pertinent
to the crime under investigation.
(The record is precisely the same
even though the subject remains
silent instead of replying by the
usual "yes" or "no.')
Therefore, in view of the fact (1) that
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lay testimony is admissible concerning the physiological and psychological reactions of a person when
accused or when being tried for a
criminal offense (Boykin v. People,
McAdory v. State, supra), and (2)
that compulsory submission to a
"lie-detector" test does not provoke
"compulsory testimony" (if the
analogy to the decisions cited in the
previous paragraph is valid), it
would seem that an accused individual may be forced to submit to
the examination.
The evidence
thus obtained could be presented to
a court by either (or both) of two
methods. A qualified expert might
testify as to the recorded reactions
and his interpretation thereof, or
else the polygraph record could be
presented to the court with merely
an explanation by the expert as to
what physiological changes, if any,
occurred during the interrogation.
The Wisconsin court in the
Bohner case placed considerable
emphasis upon the fact that if a
defendant in a criminal case is permitted to have tests taken outside
of court and then to introduce the
results when favorable, without the
necessity of his taking the witness
stand, the way would be open to
abuses that would not promote the
cause of justice. But this objection is easily met by the suggestion
that whenever a defendant seeks to
introduce testimony of this nature
he will be considered as having
waived his privilege of refraining
from taking the witness stand. Of
course, the Wisconsin court also intimated that an accused could not
be compelled to submit to the examination. But, upon the analogy
of the cases previously discussed in
this note, and after taking into consideration the nature of the test, it
is here suggested that "lie-detector"
evidence is admissible even though
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obtained from an unwilling individual.
The foregoing discussion concerning the constitutionality of "liedetector" evidence assumes, for this
purpose, judicial recognition of the
science as such. That, of course, is
the first step. And eventually data
and information concerning the high
degree of accuracy of the most advanced methods for detecting deception will be presented to the courts
for their consideration in determining its judicial status as evidence
of guilt or innocence. For that
reason consideration was here given
to the possible methods by which a
court could admit the evidence without violating the constitutional safeguard against self-incrimination,
and also without prejudicing the
cause of the prosecution.
FRED

E.

INBAU.

JURY TRIAL-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STATUTE PROVIDING FOR WOMEN

JURORS.-[Illinois]
The defendant
was indicted and tried for robbery
with a dangerous weapon. A challenge to the array was made by
the accused on the ground that the
jurors were selected in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of
June 17, 1929, providing for women
jurors, which act had previously
been held unconstitutional.
The
jury tendered contained the names
of ten women. The trial court
overruled the challenge. The defendant was convicted and sentenced
for an indefinite term. Held: on
appeal, reversed and remanded.
The denial of a challenge to the array of jurors where the panel had
been selected under an unconstitutional statute ig reversible error:
People v. Patterson (1932) 350 Ill.
519, 183 N. E. 584.
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The case in which the court had
declared the women juror statute
unconstitutional was that of People
ex rel. Thoison v. Barnett (1931)
344 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. 108, 76 A. L.
R. 1044. That part of the act
amending the law applicable to
jury commissioners read as follows:
"the said commissioners . . .
shall prepare a list of all electors
of both sexes between the ages of
twenty-one and sixty years, possessing the necessary qualifications
for jury duty, to be known as the
jury list . . ." It was further
provided that "this act shall not be
in force unless the question of its
adoption has been submitted to the
legal voters of the state and approved by a majority of all votes
cast upon the proposition
. .
if a majority of the legal voters of
this state voting upon said proposition vote in favor of this act it
shall thereby and thereupon be in
force and effect in
this state":
Illinois Session Laws (1929) sec. 1
(2) and sec. 2 (2) pp. 538-539.
The Barnett case arose on a petition
brought by a taxpayer of Cook
County praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the jury commissioners of said county to prepare
the jury list and to place the names
of male citizens only upon such
list. The writ was issued upon the
ground that, under the Illinois Constitution, the General Assembly, except where it is so provided by the
constitution, has no authority to refer a general act of legislation to a
vote of the people of the state for
their decision as to whether such
act shall have effect as a law: Comment (1932) 26 11. L. Rev. 582.
This decision is in accord with the
majority view: People v. Kennedy
(1913) 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E.
442; Opinion of the Justices (1894)
160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488;
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Brawner v. Curran (1922) 141 Md.
586, 119 Atl. 250. But cf. Santo v.
State (1855) 2 Iowa 165. The precise question involved in the instant
case was considered in People v.
Schraeberg (1932) 347 Ill. 392, 179
N. E. 829, the array having been
challenged because drawn under the
law declared unconstitutional in the
Barnett case.
In sustaining the
challenge it was held that the law,
prior to the attempted change, remained in force, and that trial before a jury selected without regard to such law was a denial of the
right to trial by jury according to
the law of the land. The Illinois
Court, however, has not determined
that women may not become liable
to jury service, but only that the
legislature chose an unconstitutional
method of making them liable.
In general, the courts have held
that a constitutional provision limited in its scope to suffrage does not
automatically extend to women the
right or duty to serve upon juries
"since the statute for the appointmen of jury commissioners and
requiring them to make up a jury
list of 'all electors'" (in the case
of Illinois) "does not apply to and
was not intended to include women,
as the word 'electors' when the
statute was enacted meant male persons only": People ex rel. Fyfe v.
Barnett (1926) 319 Ill. 403, 150 N.
E. 309; In re Grilli (1920) 110
Misc. 45, 179 N. Y. S. 795; Opinions
of the Justices (1921) 237 Mass.
591, 130 N. E. 685; State v. James
(1921) 96 N. J. L. 132, 114 Atl.
553; McKinney v. State (1892) 3
Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293; State v.
Bray (1923) 153 La. 103, 95 So.
417; State v. Mittle (1922) 120 S.
C. 526, 113 S. E. 335; Comment
(1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 292; (1930)
Ill. St. B. A. 278; Comment (1925)
11 A. B. A. J. 792. However, in the
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case of People v. Barltz (1920) 212
Mich. 580, 190 N. W. 423, 12 A.
L. R. 520, the court decided that
when the Nineteenth Amendment
granting suffrage to women was
passed, women ipso facto became
entitled to perform jury duty. This
decision was grounded upon the
theory that the discharge of jury
duty is the privilege of every elector.
From the pragmatic view the decision in the Barltz case apparently
turned upon the fact that the Michigan Constitution, coupled with a
statute, required jurors to be drawn
from the electors and provided that
every citizen of the state was an
elector. Other courts also have decided, as did the Michigan Court,
that no new legislation was necessary to qualify women for jury service after the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment, but that pre-existing statutes, wherein the qualifications of jurors were phrased in
terms of "qualified voters," "qualified electors," or "electors and
householders," were broad enough
to include the newly enfranchised
voters: State v. Walker (1921) 196
Iowa 823, 185 N. W. 619; Palmer
v. State (1926) 197 Ind. 625, 150
N. E. 917; Commonwealth v. Max,efl (1921) 271 Pa. St. 378, 114 Atd.
825; State v. Rosenberg (1923)
155 Minn. 37, 192 N. W. 194; Paris
v. State (1918) 42 Nev. 229, 174
Pac. 706, 4 A. L. R. 140 (as applicable to women grand jurors);
Comment (1928) 23 I1. L. Rev. 398.
It thus becomes evident that the
courts have in all cases, including
those above, either directly or by
way of dicta, held that legislative
provision is necessary to qualify
women for jury service: People v.
Lensen (1917) 35 Cal. App. 336,
167 Pac. 406; Ex parte Mana (1918)
178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986, L. R.
A. 1918E 771; State v. James,

supra; Comment (1922) 2 Ore. L.
Rev. 30. Cf. Strauder v. West Vir-

ginia (1879) 100 U. S. 303, 310.
The reason for this rule may be
found in the fundamental nature of
jury trial as it has been developed
with the common law. The right to
vote is recognized as a constitutional
right, while jury service is regarded
as a liability, or a duty, imposed by
the law making power, and therefore may be abridged denied or enlarged by the legislature: People v.
Holmes (1930) 341 Ill. 23, 173 N.
E. 145, 71 A. L. R. 1327; Comment
(1921) 6 Va. L. Reg. (N. s.) 780.
The Illinois Constitutional provision
and jury statute have direct relation
to jury service under the common
law, wherein the very idea of a
jury was of a body of men composed of peers or equals of the
person whose rights it was selected
to determine, since man alone
served his realm as a peer. Thus,
although the common law conception of a jury as a body consisting
of twelve men had its origin at a
time when women were denied political rights, a disqualification which
has been removed by the Nineteenth
Amendment, and even though,
under the rule in the Holnes case,
it admittedly has always been within
the sole province of the legislature
to determine who, was a competent
"peer," and in what manner jurors
should be selected, and despite the
fact that in the Barltz case the
word "men" was held to have been
employed in its generic sense,
nevertheless, the courts have of
necessity held that further legislative action is necessary to make
women equally liable with men for
jury service: Comment (1927) 12
St. Louis L. Rev. 138. It cannot
properly be said, however, that additional legislation will of itself
solve the problem of the woman
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juror, inasmuch as the Illinois Constitution provides for a trial by jury
as that institution was known at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, which was a jury of twelve
men: Stephens "The Growth of
Trial by Jury in England" (1896)
10 Harv. L. Rev. 150; Thayer "The
Jury and Its Development" (1892)
5 Harv. L. Rev. 249, 295, 357. Thus
an Illinois statute making women
voters liable for jury duty will raise
a question requiring close reasoning on the part of the court if it is
to be upheld under the present constitution. It would not seem impertinent, however, to offer the
prediction that a legislative enactment providing substantially that all
male and female electors shall be
liable to serve as jurors, will, in the
light of modern tendencies, be upheld by the court.
ROBERT T. WRIGHT.

concealed her interest in the case
and friendship for those indicted.
The evidence also showed that she
argued with and explained transactions of the case to the other jurors
upon personal information while the
trial was in process. Finally, evidence of her conduct in the jury
room was admitted showing that
the petitioner would not listen to
the arguments of the other jurors
and told them that a 'witness for the
government had previously perjured himself to convict an innocent man in the South, which information came to her personally
through her husband during the
trial. She hung the jury and admitted in her answer that she voted
for acquittal. The Circuit Court
upheld her conviction for contempt:
Clark v. United States (C. C. A.
8th 1932) 61 F. (2d) 695. Held:
on certiorari, affirmed. The privilege that protects from exposure
the arguments and ballots of a
CONTEMPT - JUROR'S INTENT TO juror does not obtain if his place
OBSTRUCT JUSTICEon the jury was fraudulently beADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT IN THE gun or fradulently continued: Clark
JURY RooM.-[Federal]
The peti- v. United States (1933) 53 Sup. Ct.
tioner, Genevieve Clark, was con- 314.
victed of criminal contempt in that,
Dean Pound has said that in one
with intent to obstruct justice, she way or another almost all the vexed
gave answers knowingly false and questions of the science of law
others knowingly misleading in re- prove to be phases of the problem
sponse to questions affecting her
of adjustment between rule and disqualifications as a juror for the trial cretion: Pound, Interpretations of
of one Foshay and others in Min- Legal History (1923) p. 1. It is of
neapolis, who were charged with necessity then that we study the
the use of the mails in furtherance discretion as well as the rule: Havigof a scheme to defraud: United hurst, Services in the Home-A
Study of Contract Concepts in DoStates v. Clark (D. C. Minn. 1931)
1 F. Supp. 747. The petitioner, mestic Relations (1932) 41 Yale L.
discovering the trial for which she Rev. 388. The rule in the instant
was called was to be that of Foshay, case is that a juror has a privilege
realizing that she might be dis- which protects from exposure his
qualified, and desiring to serve as a arguments and ballots while conjuror for "special reasons," con- sidering his verdict: R. v. Kahalewai
cealed her former employment by
(1873) 3 How. 465, 470; State v.
the Foshay Company, and further
Powell (1824) 7 N. J. L. 244, 248.
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See Woodward v. Leavitt (1871)
107 Mass. 453, 460. Cf. Matter of
Cochran (1924) 237 N. Y. 336, 340,
143 N. E. '212; People ex rel. Numis
v. County Court (1919) 188 App. Div.
424, 430, 176 N. Y. S. 858. The
origin of the privilege seems to be
ancient usage which is now assumed and conceded; its reason is
stated to be the public policy that
desires independence of thought and
will not permit stifling of debate in
the jury room which might result
from fear of exposure: 4 Wiginore
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) §2346. This
social policy conflicts in the present
case with another social consideration, that of preventing fraud in
trial by jury. Mr. Justice Cardozo,
though recognizing the privilege in
general outline, considered the integrity of the jury in the instant
case of greater social need than
keeping inviolate the privilege. He
therefore exercised the discretion
and drew an exception to the privilege rule, or rather limited its scope,
by holding it not applicable where
the relation out of which it arose
had been fraudulently begun or
fraudulently continued.
To accomplish this, the court set up the
postulate of the privilege as arising
from an honestly created relationship, and by the aid of distinctions
and analogies it achieved the result
which recognized the paramount
social policy.
The analogy of the attorney and
client privilege, applied here by the
court, provides a workable technique, i. e., the privilege survives
until the relation is abused and
vanishes when abuse is shown to
the satisfaction of the judge. (See
cases collected in the instant case.)
This keeps the privilege inviolate
from impertinence and malice, and
permits its violation, not upon a
mere charge of illegality, but only

after a prima facie case has been
made out by other evidence showing that the privilege ought not to
be allowed. Thus the evidence
made available by invasion of the
jury room is only allowed by way
of corroboration of a case already
made out. By this construction the
crime does not depend upon conduct
in the jury room but is completed
by the perjury with intent to obstruct justice. The facts in the instant case fit this, for the petitioner
was not charged with perjury, nor
with the obstruction of the processes
of justice, but that by means of
perjury she attempted to put herself
in a position where she could so
obstruct justice. Accepting this
theory of the crime it would seem
that whether the petitioner actually
obstructed justice or not was immaterial and that there would still
be contempt although she actually
voted according to her conscience
and justice was not obstructed. The
rationale of this possibly unjust result, which is the logical result of
the court's reasoning, is that if justice was not in fact obstructed by
the fraud of the talesman, the contempt proceedings probably would
not bQ brought, although all the
necessary elements would be present.
The decision as it is limited, however, is sound, and disturbs no other
authority or rule. As the court
pointed out, the authority of Bushell's case that jurors shall have the
privilege of returning a verdict according to their conscience is not
impaired, for the petitioner was not
held to answer for any verdict, but
for the deceit whereby she put herself in the position to vote at all:
Bushell's Case (1670) Vaughan
135. Moreover, if there had been a
verdict, the rule that the testimony
of a juror is not admissible for the
impeachment of his verdict would
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be maintained with whatever integrity it otherwise has: McDonald v.
Pless (1915) 238 U. S. 264, 35 Sup.
Ct. 783. In any event the rule is
wholly unrelated to the problem of
the proper limits of the inviolate
privilege itself.
See Mattox v.
United States (1892) 146 U. S. 140,
13 Sup. Ct. 50. Cf. 5 Wigmore "Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2353, 2354.
The decision also renounced whatever was left of the rule that the
oath of the contemnor is a bar to
prosecution for contempt. Even the
privileged communications rule, forbidding the use of the juror's testimony for any purpose whatever, is
maintained, for if the juror has
honestly created his relationship, he
can claim the full vigor of his privilege: 4 Wigmore "Evidence" (2d ed.
1923) § 2346.
STANLEY THOMAS.

ARREST

WARRANT -

WITHOUT

SEARCH AND

SEIZURE

-

CONCEALED

WEAPONS.-[Illinois]
Police officers entered a building at about
10:30 o'clock at night and arrested
two girls, who admitted that they
were practicing prostitution. Upon
inquiry made by the officers, the
girls said that there were two "sluggers" in the storeroom on the
ground floor who were their men.
This room, fitted up as a gymnasium, apparently was operated in
connection with the house of ill
fame. Upon entering the room the
officers asked three men, seated
around a table to stand up. The
men remained seated and were told
by the officers, "We are police officers, stand up." The men did not
stand as requested and two of the
officers seized and searched each of
them finding pistols on defendant
and one other. These men were
taken into custody, and the officers

proceeded to search the entire building. Prior to his trial on an indictment for carrying concealed
weapons, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. This
motion was denied. Held: on appeal, affirmed. The seizing and arrest of the men was justified, and
the introduction of the guns in evidence was proper: People v. Roberta
(Ill. 1933) 185 N. E. 370.
The instant case appears to sustain an arrest without warrant as
lawful where there is scant evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant had committed a
criminal offense. The police had no
warrant to search the building nor
to arrest any person therein. There
was no disturbance of any kind and
defendant had committed no criminal offense in the presence of the
officers. The decision is based on
two statutes one making it a misdemeanor to have any connection
with a house of ill fame, whether
in the capacity of owner, keeper,
patron, or inmate: Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd 1929) Ch. 38 secs.
162, 163, and the other authorizing
an officer to arrest if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
the person to be arrested has committed a criminal offense: Ill. Rev.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1929) Ch. 38,
sec. 657. "Criminal offense," as
used in the latter statute embraces
both felonies and misdemeanors:
People v. Scalisi (1926) 324 Ill.
131, 154 N. E. 715. It is contended
that the officers had reasonable
grounds for believing that the defendant was in some way connected
with the disorderly house, and it is
on the acceptance of this contention by the court that the decision
rests.
Another recent decision sustains
an arrest without warrant on evidence no more weighty in character
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than that in the instant case: People v. Kissane (1932) 347 Ill. 385,
179 N. E. 850. Here the court held
a revolver admissible in evidence
where the person carrying it was
arrested by officers, according to
their testimony, on the grounds that
they suspected him of a bank robbery committed two days before.
Defendant was a known gangster
and in spite of a very reasonable
contention by counsel that the testimony of the officers was obviously
a false story, neither the Appellate
nor the Supreme Court would reverse the case.
Two earlier decisions involving
similar questions had proved extremely unpopular from the layman's
viewpoint: People v. Scalisi (1926)
324 Ill. 131, 154 N. E. 715; People
v. McGurn (1931) 341 Il. 632, 173
N. E. 754; see Note, 22 J. of Cr.
Each of these cases inL. 589.
volved notorious gunmen and each
was reversed, the former partially,
the latter entirely on the ground
that the arresting officers bad no
reasonable grounds for making the
arrest. Judging from the four cases
mentioned it might appear that the
court now requires less by way of
evidence to support reasonable belief than at the time of the Scalisi
and McGurn cases. That this is
not so may be readily ascertained
from an examination of the testimony of the arresting officers in
each case. In the Scalisi case,
where a detective squad car followed and stopped a car full of
gangsters not knowing them to be
such, the testimony given by the
officers was in effect as follows:
"that at the time of the pursuit, the
men in the other car were unknown
to the officers; that the latter knew
of no felony or misdemeanor the
others might have committed; that
the officers had no warrant or pro-
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cess of law for their arrest, and had
no knowledge that any of them was
a fugitive from justice; that it was
the purpose of the officers to interrogate the men, to stop them
and find out who they were." In the
McGurn case the testimony was essentially this: "there was no felony or misdemeanor which had in
fact been committed, for the commission of which there was any
reasonable grounds to suspect the
defendant. There was nothing about
the attending circumstances which
would lead a reasonable and prudent man to believe that defendant
was in fact committing any criminal
offense or which would justify the
officer in making the arrest." The
only attempt to justify the arrest
was a statement by one of the officers that he was acting under orders
of his superior to arrest defendant
on sight. In both cases the officers' testimony precluded affirmance.
In the layman's eyes such testimony
plays no part. He knows only the
bare facts; that defendants were
known gangsters, that they had
broken the law and been arrested,
that they were convicted by a jury,
and that the supreme court reversed
the case.
The court must trouble itself with
a further problem not entering into
the layman's reasoning. "The question is whether protection for the
individual would not be gained at a
disproportionate loss of protection
for society": Cardozo, J., People v.
Defore (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, p. 24,
150 N. E. 585. Involved in the
problem is the constitutional guaranty that citizens shall be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
On the other hand is the feeling,
fast increasing in strength, that gunmen, especially in our larger cities,
should not be released after arrest
upon what appears to the layman
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an absurd technicality. The layman's viewpoint must not be too
summarily cast aside, for although
the judge and lawyer may, through
greater knowledge, become impatient with his criticism, it may well
be true that this constitutional guaranty needs tempering to better adapt
it to the present day of organized
crime. It must appear an inadequacy in the law to allow well
known criminals to walk the streets
carrying concealed weapons unmolested by police. It must appear a
greater deficiency that such a gangster, brought before a court on a
charge of carrying a concealed weapon is released upon the ground
that the arresting officer had no
reasonable grounds for believing
that the gangster had committed a
criminal offense. It is the layman's
viewpoint, shared to some extent by

the judge, which has dictated affirmances in concealed weapon cases
involving gangsters on evidence
which in other types of cases would
in all likelihood result in reversals:
People v. DeLuica (1931) 343 Ill.
269, 175 N. E. 370.
The Scalisi and McGurn cases
have accomplished a purpose, for
by them the police were initiated
into some of the vagaries of the
law.
The Kissane and Roberta
cases show no change in the application of the law by the court, but
show more intelligent testimony by
the arresting officers, which is at
least adequate, if believed by a jury,
on which to hang an affirmance.
There is in each of these later
cases, in legal conception, "evidence
to support the verdict."
HARDY KING MACLAY.

